Qatar Foundation Annual Research Conference Proceedings Volume 2016 Issue 1

A growing phenomenon, which is gaining attention worldwide, is the rapid diffusion of themed-sport areas as legacies of mega-sporting events. An example of it is offered by the city of Doha. On the occasion of 2006 Asian Games, the capital of Qatar faced some significant urban transformations. The principal legacy left after staging the event is the implementation of the Aspire Zone, Doha's Sports City. Is this legacy beneficial in a long-term perspective? What is the value added to the city and its inhabitants? This study attempts at providing insight into the potential offered by themed-sport areas as legacies of mega events, and it aims at evaluating the rationale for the realization of sports dedicated zones, analysing their impact from a physical and social perspective. Specifically, the research offers an investigation into the long-term cost-benefit effect of the Aspire Zone, Doha Sports City, by conducting a post-occupancy evaluation. Conclusions show that there is a potential to realize sports-oriented area that are fully integrated into cities, but the design of a comprehensive and long-term plan is needed. Moreover, providing a sports city with a variety of different activities and functions will contribute to attracting different types of users and avoid occasional use. Mega-events have existed for a very long time, but it is only since the last century that they have been perceived and adopted as tools of urban transformation. Many scholars define the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome as the first example of event intentionally used for urban redevelopment purposes, while the Olympic Village set for the 1972 Olympics in Munich is considered an early case of event led sports city, as the village was concentrated in one main area (the Olympic Park), instead of being spread around the city, and as it was specifically designed for delivering urban leisure. Both Rome and Munich opened the way, and nowadays cities are increasingly competing and bidding to secure the hosting of mega-events, attracted by their potential urban regeneration effect. However, results are not encouraging, and literature shows how difficult is to transform event sites into well-integrated areas inside cities. These adverse outcomes are even exacerbated when events are used for the redevelopment of brownfield zones, or when events are held in suburban areas, because apart from sports activities, generally only a few other services are offered. This is the case of Sydney, which held the Olympics in 2000. Its sports site at Homebush Bay is about 15 km far from the city centre, and it has been under-utilised since the post-staging event. The Arabian Peninsula is not an exception in the desire of staging mega-events, being the area characterized by a massive sportification, expressed through the birth of several sports TV channels (Al Jazeera Sports, Dubai Sports, Saudi Sports, and Abu Dhabi Sport channels, among others), through the increasing migration flows of international athletes and trainers toward the region, and through the significant rise in the number of international sport events held (e.g.: Bahrain International Formula One Grand Prix, Doha Moto GP, Dubai World Cup of horse racing, Doha Tennis ATP Tournament, and many others). In the case of Doha, the phenomenon of sportification is translated into the desire of transforming the city into a sporting hub: looking at the official Qatar Tourism website, the first theme of the section “Activities” is dedicated to “Sports”, in which Qatar is defined as “Home to Sports”. Moreover, sport has a key role in the 2030 Qatar National Vision, in which sports tourism is indicated as an example of economy diversification from the oil-based model. Finally, Doha has bided and staged many international events: twenty-two international tournaments were hosted only in 2013 (Table 1), and this number will grow in the future. The process of transforming itself into an international sporting hub started with the Asian Games in 2006. In that occasion, the city faced some significant urban transformations. One of them, the principal legacy, is the implementation of the Aspire Zone, Doha's Sports City (Fig. 1). Is this legacy beneficial in a long-term perspective? What is the value added to City and its inhabitants? Did it worth to build it or not? Moreover, finally, does it fulfil the need for public spaces in Doha? These are the questions that framed this study, and that will be analysed in the next section of the research. In particular, the study investigates the lack of urban public spaces in Doha, and it argues that themed-sports area can fulfil this scarcity. The research analysed the main legacy left by 2006 Asian Games: the Aspire Zone, Doha's sports-themed area. In particular, the study focused on the analysis of the physical and social impact on the city. According to the literature, sport-themed areas are extremely costly, underused, segregated spaces, which are far from being considered liveable, social and sustainable. These negative characteristics are often exacerbated by strict event specifications on design and high external pressure by event rights holders. The risk of this kind of developments is to increase the level of physical isolation and segregation. The study showed there is a potential to realize sports-oriented districts that are fully integrated into the hosting cities. But first, the locations chosen for the event need to be carefully selected according to the morphology and the needs of the city. Moreover, as Barcelona strategy showed, a more comprehensive and long-term plan can prevent these areas to be under-utilized, desolate and segregated, and regardless of where these sports facilities are placed, the best results in term of social impact can be reached if they are totally integrated into the city and fully used by residents. As the Aspire Zone in part accomplished, providing a sports city with a variety of different resources and functions will tend to attract different types of users and avoid occasional use. Adding to stadia and elitist venues more participatory sports facilities, green and open spaces, museums and exhibitions, shopping centres will increment the number of visitors, so that the sites will not be used only by athletes and passive spectators, creating liveable, self-sufficient, and socially inclusive urban areas. To conclude, when bidding for an event it is critical to have clear in mind the reasons why hosting it and to design the long-term legacies from the very beginning, at an early stage of the planning implementation. Cities as Doha, which lacks public spaces, can benefit from the creation of themed areas as legacies of events, but the risk is once again to focus on building iconic and spectacular physical venues at the expense of societal development that can improve the quality of life of its citizens. Looking at the future, staging the 2022 World Cup will be an unrepeatable occasion for transforming Doha into a more vibrant and liveable city: will the city take advantage of it? Hopefully, it will, but it cannot do it without learning from past experiences and mistakes, without looking at good examples and best practices, and without planning a long-term legacies strategy for it.

Acknowledgments

This article was made possible by GSRA grant # GSRA1-1-1119-13007 from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation). The findings achieved herein are solely the responsibility of the author.

In 2013, The Central Bank of Libya declared that all Libyan banking institutions must become ‘sharia compliant’ by 2015. Thus, Central Bank of Libya (2013) has formally introduce the Islamic banking and finance model to be compulsory for the first time. Indeed, many Libyan banking institutions especially public banks will go through different complex organizational change processes in order to be able to act the rules of the Islamic banking organizations. Therefore, it is expected that, the processes of building up such organizing procedures will not take any definitive patterns, either implicitly or explicitly as shown in much of organizational change literature. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how different actors work out how to develop and achieve transforming banking practices into a model that is consistent with the principles of sharia and its practical applications. Yet, this organizational phenomenon has attracted our attention and it becomes increasingly difficult to neglect further exploration and understanding of the manner in which such organizational change processes are constructed and translated within the context of this country. To achieve the above objective this study follows two influential theoretical concepts of organizational change. Change as fluxing reality (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002) embodied in process philosophy and a “translation” model (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). The latter is also referred to as “processual, networked” approach (Nicolini, 2010). Therefore, this study will adapt the two theoretical perceptions to explore and account for the translation of a broad organizational/societal programme into local forms of actions. Whilst, the former presents a contemporary ontological understanding on how social phenomenon such as organizations and change should be constructed and therefore understood (Collins, 2002, 2004), the latter will allow us to follow processual networked patterns of organizing in an attempt to understand different social and complex organizational aspects of constructing change processes. In doing so, this study will draw on three case studies from the banking sector in Libya and based on a qualitative, inductive approach it seeks to explore the complex dynamics of organizational change processes within the Libyan banking context. In particular, the study seeks to contribute to organization theory in three main areas (A) exploring the very nature of organizational change processes and how change is constructed and translated. (b) To illustrate how actors enable and/constrain the translation process itself and with what consequences. (c) To contribute to the sociology of translation by mapping out what actors do to translate the concept of Islamic banking and finance into everyday practices.

نحاول في هذا البحث استعراض آراء الباحثين حول علم التأريخ لدى المسلمين، هل كان لدى المسلمين علم تأريخ خاص بهم؟ ونذكر ثلاثة آراء رئيسة تتناول هذا الموضوع. الرأي الأول: يرى أصحاب هذا الرأي أن ابن خلدون هو المؤسس الأول لعلم التأريخ، بتلك النظرة الغربية الحديثة لابن خلدون التي تجعل منه عالما غربيا بامتياز، وتتناسىى كونه عربيا مسلما حضارة وثقافة، يرى هؤلاء العلماء أن ما جاء في المقدمة هو نتاج تميز شخصي حاز عليه ابن خلدون، ومن ثم فهو ليس له امتداد تاريخي في الحضارة الإسلامية، وإنما هو كخضراء الدمن نشأ فريدا غريبا، ولذا كان الغربيون هم أول من اهتموا به ولفتوا النظر إلى ابن خلدون لأن العرب لم يكونوا ليفهموا هذا العلم الحديث لأنه ليس علمهم بل هو علم غربي كما يزعمون، حتى إن العرب لم يستفيدوا من كتابات ابن خلدون فعلم التاريخ عندهم لم يتغير بعده كثيرا، فالتغير ظل قاصرا على ظهور كتب الخطط، أما كتب التاريخ مثل كتاب السخاوي مثلًا فقد ظلت على ما هي عليه قبل ابن خلدون ولو يؤثر عليها الكتابات الخلدونية. ويذهب إلى هذا الرأي وجيه كوثراني. الرأي الثاني: أن المسلمين ليسوا في حاجة لعلم تأريخ من الأساس، ذلك أن العلم الذي استعمله المسلمون واعتمدوا عليه في معرفة الصواب من الخطأ التاريخي كان علم الإسناد، وهو العلم الذي لم يوجد لدى أحد من الأمم بهذا الشكل والحجم من قبل. فعلم الإسناد بما يتبعه من علم الرجال والجرح والتعديل والطبقات والوفيات والأنساب لم يحوج المسلمين إلى الاعتناء كثيرا بعلوم نقد المتن، وإن كان هذا لا يعني عدم وجودها البتة بطبيعة الحال، فشروط الرواية والرواة السابق الإشارة إليها ستظل هي عماد منهاج النقد عند أهل السنة في جميع أطواره، وإن اختلفت درجة الاحتكام إليها من طور لآخر من حيث التشدد أو التساهل. ويتبنى هذا الرأي أحمد الشال. والرأي الثالث: يذهب إلى أن المسلمين كان لهم علم تأريخ وهذا العلم هو علم مصطلح الحديث. ويأتي على رأس من يقولون بهذا القول أسد رستم والذي ألف كتابا سماه “مصطلح التاريخ” كأنه بهذا يجمع بين التاريخ ومصطلح الحديث. ورستم يقول إن أول نمن نظم نقد الروايات التاريخية ووضع القواعد لذلك علماء الدين الإسلامي، وهو يرى أنه ليس بإمكان كبار المؤرخين في أوروبا والغرب أن يكتبوا أفضل مما كتب علماء المصطلح وإن مباحث مثل مباحث “تحري الرواية والمجيء باللفظ” تضاهي ما ورد في نفس الموضوع مما كتبه الغربيون في عصرنا الحديث. ويضيف أن التاريخ ليس مجرد نقل للرواية والأسانيد بل علم له أصول وقواعد كما علوم الفقه والهندسة والطب، وهذه الأصول تتلاقى في كثير من الأمور مع أصول علم الحديث المتمثلة في علم المصطلح. وبعد هذا نناقش في بحثنا أولا ماهية علم التأريخ وعلاقته بعلم مصطلح الحديث، فأقول إنه لا يخفى على أحد ما امتاز به علم الإسناد في الإسلام، فهذا العلم على مر تاريخ كان مفخرة المسلمين التي لم يسبق أحد من الأمم لمثل هذا العلم كما يقول العلماء. والمتتبع لكتب التاريخ يجد علم الإسناد قد احتل نصيب الأسد في منهجية تلك الكتب. انظر على سبيل المثال كيف مكن علم الإسناد مؤرخا كالطبري من القول إن ما يكن في كتابي هذا من خبر ذكرناه عن بعض الماضين مما يستنكره قارئه، أو يستشنعه سامعه، من أجل أنه لم يعرف له وجها في الصحة، ولا معنى في الحقيقة، فليعلم أنه لم يؤت في ذلك من قبلنا، وإنما أتى من قبل بعض ناقليه إلينا، وإنا إنما أدينا ذلك على نحو ما أدي إلينا. فقد وجد في الأسانيد التي يسوقها في كل رواية عذرا ومجنا له دون نقد الناقدين، فهو بتقديمه للإسناد كأنه يقول إنما نقلت لك ما عرفت ونقلت لك أداة التمييز بين الخبيث والطيب فما عليك إلا أن تعمل الأداة لتعرفه. لكن لو لم يكن ثم الإسناد لما كان بوسع الطبري أن ينقل ما نقل وإلا كان ملبسا على الخلق. ويقول المسعودي في مقدمة كتابه إن كتابنا هذا كتاب خبر لا كتاب بحث ونظر، أما السخاوي فيقول إن شرط المؤرخ هو شرط المحدث حتى إن العلماء لم يجوزوا حكاية شيء من أمور الدين والهداية إلا بمستند تجوز بمثله الرواية لعلمهم أنه يشترط في المؤرخ ما يشترط من العدالة والضبط المضبوط ليكون معتمدا في أمر الدين وأمينا فيه بين المسلمين ولتزداد الرغبة في تاريخه من المعتبرين. بل حتى ابن خلدون الذي يعزى إليه نقد منهج الإسناد والقول بعدم كفاءته كمنهج للتاريخ، لم يهدم المنهج الإسنادي لدى المؤرخين بل أكد على أهمية الجمع بين علم السند وعلم العمران الذي أنشأه، فهو مثلا حين يذكر من أخطاء المؤرخين وقوعهم في الثقة بالناقلين يرى أن الحل في هذا هو الاعتماد على علم الجرح والتعديل. لكن هل تعني أهمية علم السند عند المسلمين أنه كان المنهجية الوحيدة التي اعتمدوا عليها؟ وهل ابن خلدون هو الوحيد الذي خرج عن هذا النسق؟ ما أدعيه أن ابن خلدون هو امتداد لمدرسة تاريخية أصيلة وأنه ليس فريدا من بابه، نعم لا شك هو قد أوضح وأصل وعمق الفكرة لكنه بنى ذلك على تاريخ إسلامي قديم، قائم على النقد والتمحيص المتجاوز لفكرة السند نفسها. وللدلالة على ذلك نسوق أمرين: الأول: أن أهل الحديث أنفسهم لم يقتصروا على نقد السند فحسب، وإذا كان الحديث الذي هو كلام المعصوم صلى الله عليه وسلم خضع لتلك المعايير فإن التاريخ أولى. يقول معتز الخطيب إن اعتماد المحدثين على الإسناد لم يمنعهم من اللجوء إلى مناهج أخرى لنقد الحديث. وقد ساق دراسة كاملة عن هذا فليراجعها من أحب. الأمر الثاني: أن المؤرخين قبل ابن خلدون أنفسهم لجئوا لمناهج أخرى غير نقد السند. من ذلك ما يرويه هارون القروي أنه رأى الواقدي بمكة ومعه ركوة فقال أين تريد؟ فقال أريد أن أمضى إلى حُنين حتى أرى الموضع والموقعة. فهو لم يكتف بالأخبار بل أراد أن يقوم بدراسات ميدانية ethnographic ليتأكد من صحتها من عدمها. والمسعودي في مقدمة تاريخه يذكر مثل سابقه كيف أنه قطع الفيافي والجبال فقطع بلاد السند والصنف والصين والزابج وخراسان وأرمينية وأذربجان والران والبيلقان والعراق والشام ليرى البلاد “معاينة” ثم هو يلوم على من قنع بما نمى له من الأخبار وقعد في بلده. ومن قرأ مقدمة ابن خلدون وقرأ مقدمة مسكويه في تاريخه الموسوم بتجارب الأمم على وجازتها أدرك ما بينهما من الشبه. واليعقوبي لا يختلف عن ذلك ففي تاريخه يذكر بعض أساطير الفرس ثم يقول إن لهم أخبار قد أثبتت.. تركناها لأن مذهبنا ترك كل مستبشع. والمسعودي أيضا مثل صاحبه، بل هو لا يكتفي بنقد تلك الأخبار بل قد يذكرها ويعللها وفق ما يرى من علوم فيعلل ما يذكره العرب من الغول والعنقاء بأنه نتاج التوحد في القفار والإنسان إذا تفكر وإذا تفكر جبن فتدخله الظنون والأوهام ويتراءى له ما ليس بحقيقة. ما أفرضه في الجزء الثاني من هذا البحث أن على الباحث عن علم التأريخ الإسلامي أن يوسع نطاق بحثه ليتجاوز كتب التاريخ فيبحث في علوم الآلة عند المسلمين مثل علم الكلام الإسلامي وعلم أصول الفقه وما مثلهما من علوم المناهج. وما أحاوله هنا هو وضع لبنة في سبيل بناء هذا العلم من خلال جمع الأشتات الموجودة في تلك العلوم والمتعلقة بنقد التاريخ. والباحث في هذا الباب عليه أن يأخذ في اعتباره مجموعة من الاحترازات: فنحن حين نتحدث عن نقد التاريخ فإننا نعني به نقد التاريخ كما فهمه المسلمون في عصرهم، ولسنا ملزمين بالتقيد بمباحث نقد التاريخ الحديث والذي يجدر التنبيه على أنه علم غربي. وكذلك أننا حين نتحدث عن تشابه بين العلوم الإسلامية وعلم التأريخ المعاصر فهذا لا يعني نوع تطابق أو تماثل، أو أن التقسيات المعرفية الغربية يمكن أن تنطبق على التقسيمات الإسلامية. ثالثا أن تداخل العلوم لا يعني أن كل المناهج الموجودة في علوم الكلام أو الأصول أو المنطق يمكن تطبيقها على علم التاريخ، فالفروق موجودة بين العلوم ونفس المسألة قد تبحث في علم الكلام مثلا وقد يكون حكمها شيئا ما. وأخيرا فإن عدم جمع تلك القواعد في علم واحد في العصور المسلمة السابقة، لا يعني أنهم كانوا يجهلون تلك القواعد، فتلك القواعد كانت معلومة لدى الجميع وليست مما يخفى على دارس للعلم. وسنعرض بعد ذلك في بحثنا لمجموعة من القضايا والمناهج التي تشترك بين التاريخ وبين مناهج العلوم الأخرى كعلم الكلام والأصول ونحوها كما أسلفنا. وسنكتفي هنا في هذا الملخص بعرض مثال واحد لتلك النقاشات لأن المجال لا يتسع لأكثر من ذلك على أن تكون تلك المحاولة هي لبنة في بناء علم متكامل، من ذلك مثلا: هل يرى المسلمون أن للتاريخ قوانين وقواعد مضطردة يسير عليها؟ هل الأحداث التاريخية ناشئة عن أسباب عقلية لازمة أم عن مسببات غيبية متعالية؟ والإجابة على ذلك تطرقنا للحديث عن السببية وهو حديث قديم تطرق إليه علماء الكلام منذ القرن الأول الهجري، وهو كان وما زال محل جدل بين علماء المسلمين، لكن هل يمكننا تنزيل هذا الخلاف على الدراسات التاريخية؟ يرى الأشاعرة أن العلاقة بين السبب والمسبب هي علاقة عادية وليست تلازمية، بمعنى أن ما يجعل النار تحرق القطن ليس قوة كامنة في النار، وليس نتيجة علاقة تلازمية بين النار والقطن بحيث كلما عرضت القطن للقطن احترق، وإنما هي علاقة عادية بمعنى أنه قد جرت العادة على أن يحترق القطن كلما وضع على النار، لكن هل يعني هذا أن المسلمين لا يؤمنون بقوانين تحكم التاريخ وأنهم يعزون كل الأسباب إلى قوة الإله المتعالية كما كان هو الحال في القرون الوسطى في أوروبا؟ كما يقول أوغطسين إن الله أبدي وهو خالق الزمن، ولا يجوز فهم الأبدي ولا وصفه من وجهة نظر الموقت.. وليس في الإمكان الاعتقاد أن الله ترك ممالك البشر خارج قوانين العناية. ومن ثم فإن من الحكمة تعليل الأحداث بأنها مشيئة الله وخلقه يصرفه كيفما شاء. لكن المتتبع لكلام الأشاعرة يجدهم لا ينفون وجود علاقة بين السبب والمسبب، لكنهم يقولون إن هذه العلاقة علاقة عادية أي غير لازمة يمكن تخلفها، ومن ثم فلا مانع من أن نفسر تلك العلاقة وأن نبحث عن عللها وأسرارها، وهنا يظهر الفرق بين مذهب المسلمين ومذهب المسيحيين في القرون الوسطى فإن كان كلا الطرفين يسلمون بأن الأمر بيد الله، فإن المسلمين يرون أن هذا لا يتعارض مع وجود علاقة ما تفسر الأحداث التاريخية تفسيرا بشريا، وإن كانت هذه العلاقة غير لازمة. يذكر ولفرد كانتون سميث كيف أن الهندي لا يأبه للتاريخ ولا يحس بوجوده لأن التاريخ هو عالم الحس والهندي دائما مشغول بعالم الروح، وكيف أن المسيحي يعيش دائما في عالمين منفصلين المثل الأعلى غير القابل للتطبيق والواقع البشري المنقطع عن ذلك العالم، أما المسلم فالتاريخ بالنسبة له نسيج مشترك في حرية الإنسان وحكم الله. والسؤال الآخر هو هل هذه السنن مضطردة بمعنى أنها تحدث في كل عصر وزمان وكل زمان بغض النظر عن الفروق بين البشر؟ وهل هذه القواعد التي يتوصل إليها هي قابلة للخطأ أم هي مثل ما يدعى عن قواعد العلوم الطبيعية من أنها يمكن أن نصل إليها من غير خطأ، وهذا ينقلنا إلى مبحث القطعي والظني عند المسلمين. فإذا كان التاريخ يتوصل له من خلال استقراء الحوداث المختلفة وجمعها للوصول إل نتيجة ما، فتلك النتيجة إذا كانت نتيجة استقراء ناقص فهي ظنية وإن كانت نتيجة استقراء تام وهذا غير ممكن في التاريخ غالبا فهو قطعي الدلالة. وفي النهاية أعتقد أن هذه الدراسة قد تشكل نقلة مهمة وثورية في دراسة علم التأريخ لدى المسلمين، وقد تفتح الباب نحو إعادة فهم علم التأريخ الإسلامي بمنظور مختلف عن مجرد الحصر الضيق على الدراسات التاريخية فقط، فهي تقود إلى التركيز على أماكن لم يعن بها المؤرخون في بحثهم من قبل، وهي علوم الآلة لدى المسلمين متمثلة في علوم الكلام وأصول الفقه وعلوم القرآن.

The massive influx of foreign residents and workforce led to the exacerbation of the demographic imbalance in the GCC countries. As the rise of expatriate population may contribute to the economic growth, it may have an enormous impact on the regional social landscape. Therefore, the governments of the GCC States are trying to shape the process of national identity construction and attempt to rediscover their sense of self. During the past years, the debate about demographic imbalance has intensified in the region. It could be argued that the phenomena of “a minority in their homeland” mainly occurred due to the expansion of the oil industry, which has led to the inflow of a massive number of foreigners, leading to raise the concerns among GCC countries about the stability of the national identity in light of the disproportionate population demographics. Since the concept of identity from the social science perspective projects it as a fluid and a dynamic concept. This means, identity undergoes changes and transformations but this occurs in a state of relative stability. Consequently, this helped the Gulf States have led an up-bottom process of national identity construction by applying certain strategies for two related reasons. First, to establish a common sense of national identity among the locals that would make them feel distinctive from other countries. Secondly, through this instrument of building a national identity the GCC States would balance between the rapid modernization that is occurring within their borders and their indigenous values. Qatar is no exception in regard to what is happening in the Gulf. In fact, the last years has witnessed a rapid increase in the foreign population. This has resulted in establishing a number of cultural and national projects that aim to consolidate a sense of a Qatari national identity among the locals. The paper argues that Qatar has followed several procedures in order to construct and consolidate the sense of national identity within its nationals. First, this is done through revitalizing their heritage and past. Second, Qatar started to focus more on celebrating national occasions and creating a common sense of al-mwatana, belonging or loyalty. Third, they have put significant emphasis on the educational system. finally, the use of Arabic language in Qatar University is considered as a mean to enhance the sense of national identity. In order to pursue this argument, this paper first discusses the concept of identity and how countries built their national identities. Secondly, the paper addresses the debate about the absence of a nationalist history in the GCC as understood elsewhere in the Middle East. In this regard, it would focus on how tribal and religious identities were reinforced by the GCC states and how this has influenced the emergence of a coherent national identity. The second part will discusses the construction of Qatari heritage in the context of pre-conceived ideas of ‘cultural heritage’ predominant in the global and regional spheres that operate in this country. In the third part, the article would examine process of constructing this national idea and how it's been done. Finally, the paper would assess the measures used by Qatar in order to build a coherent national identity, and address what may challenge such coherence.

Abstract for Qatar Foundation Annual Research Conference 2016 Qatari Women's Engagement in Politics By: Noor Khalifa Al-Tamaimi For the past year and a half, I have been a student researcher on the QNRF UREP grant, “Qatari Women: Engagement and Empowerment” (UREP 15-035-5-013). The grant as a whole focused on understanding the drivers and the obstacles of women's empowerment in Qatar. We focused our research on female participation in women's gatherings in the Majlis and its links to societal engagement. I was involved in several aspects of the grant project, including ethnographic observation, photography, writing the survey questionnaire, creating a documentary, and now analyzing the survey data. The survey aimed to understand the perceptions of both the Qatari males and females about a number of cultural, educational, economic, and political topics. I will be using a few of the survey findings to investigate my theory. I start my research with a puzzle: Qatari women are equally educated and equally interested in politics as Qatari men, and yet Qatari women are very underrepresented in the political sphere. Why are Qatari women choosing not to pursue politics after graduation? My analysis of our survey results points to an answer: cultural norms and social pressure. In a society where males hold the majority of influential positions women undergo a series of challenges to be noticed. Cultural norms also pressure women not to pursue a career they could excel in. Statistics show that women have virtually the same interest in local politics as men did. Yet the survey results also show that both genders believe that males make better political leaders than women do. Also, a majority of Qataris believe there is social pressure for women to focus on family instead of work. All of these findings lead to a conclusion. I suspect that women are not choosing to pursue politics because there is a substantial societal pressure women them not to pursue politics, and because of the difficulties of reaching the targeted position because of their gender. Qatar's recent development saw a statewide encouragement in developing a knowledge-based economy that requires more qualified people to pursue jobs in all spheres political, economic and scientific (Qatar National Vision 2030). Statistics show that more women are completing higher education than men, making them well educated and qualified to pursue any job (Ridge 2014; Walker 2014). Yet when it comes to joining the workforce, a number of women choose not to pursue the career their college degree qualifies them to achieve. The fact is, when it comes to pursuing work in politics or holding important political positions, there is a clear majority of men holding these positions. My preliminary research shows that Qatari men outnumber Qatari women in key political positions throughout the country: out of 29 Municipal Council members there are 2 women. Out of the 35 Majlis Al-Shura members there are no females and there is one female out of 100 male Ambassadors. Why aren't women choosing to pursue politics? Some may say that there is a lack of political interest among women. Yet my survey analysis shows no difference between Qatari women and Qatari men when asked if they were interested in local politics: The survey found that 3 of every 4 Qataris, whether male or female, are very interested or somewhat interested in local politics. And my own research into the gender of those who attend the politics programs of local universities such as Qatar University and Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar show that women outnumber men in these programs. Thus, there is substantial interest in political studies for both males and females. Is the lack of societal support the reason why we see so few women in the political sphere in Qatar? The survey results clearly show that Qatari society is divided on whether women have a place in the political sphere. 6 out of 10 Qataris believe it is acceptable for a woman to run for political office, meaning that almost 40 percent of society does not view this as acceptable. On the other hand 3 of 4 Qataris feel that men make better political leaders than women do. These results are the same for both men and women, showing that this is not a male attitude, but a societal attitude toward the place of women in the political sphere. In my opinion, these survey findings show that there is a substantial pressure on women to stay out of the political sphere. My theory is that there is a considerable social constraint from both the males and the females in the Qatari society on women not to pursue a political job. This social constraint in my opinion comes from the fact that males outnumbers females in key political positions which leads to the societal conception that women are incapable of handling key political positions. There could be several reasons behind the pressure on women not to pursue politics. Our survey found that 7 out of 10 Qataris believe there is social pressure on women to focus on family instead of work. Another reason could be the belief that men belong in politics while women do not, as almost 40 percent of Qataris believe it is not acceptable for women to run for political office. A third reason could be the cultural norm of women taking on public jobs that require them to constantly travel or appear in the media. Fourth, the fact that most political and high-positioned jobs are male dominated makes it hard for women to rise in job status. I recognize that a Qatari woman's choice not to pursue politics after graduation could be a result of many social, educational, and societal factors. Yet the research shows that females are graduating at higher rates than men, and that women are as interested in politics as men, so the small numbers of females in key political positions are indeed disappointing. This research aims to understand the reason behind women's under representation in the political sphere through our original survey research and my additional interview research in the hopes that these findings will help ease the path for more Qatari women to participate in the political sphere in the future.

References

“Economic Development.” Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics. Accessed November 14, 2015. http://www.mdps.gov.qa/portal/page/portal/gsdp_en/qatar_national_vision/Economic_development.

Qatar National Vision 2030. General Secretariat for Development Planning. July 2008.

Qatari Women: Engagement and Empowerment. $150,000 from Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation), UREP 15-035-5-013. Grant, March 29, 2014–September 29, 2015.

Ridge, Natasha. Education and the Reverse Gender Divide in the Gulf States: Embracing the Global, Ignoring the Local. New York: Teachers College Press, 2014.

Walker, Lesly. “Female University Students in Qatar Outnumber Men 2:1 - Doha News.” Doha News. June 12, 2014. Accessed November 14, 2015. http://dohanews.co/female-university-students-outnumber-males-nearly/.

Little research has been done to trace back and document the role of women artists from the Arabian Gulf countries in the local and international art scene. This could be justified due to the fact that women in the recent past were not accepted in public spheres. However, even after the emergence of modernism in most of the Gulf countries, the cultural sector remains somehow gendered where women artists have to self-censor their ideas and work in order to be accepted in the art scene. As a result, their work remain absent or sometimes represented in a way that succumbs to institutional and curatorial decisions. This takes away so much creativity of their work and also the opportunity of engaging the public around topics that reflect women's perspective on culture and heritage. There are many examples about work done by women artists from this region that ended up either derived from its original messages when curate or even shut down entirely when tried to reimagine the idea of women and traditions in the Gulf. This leads many women artists such as Shirin Neshat and Sophia Al Maria for example to turn their work to western art institutions where their work is sold and appreciated by wider audience. It's important to document the complexities, uniqueness and differences of the backgrounds of these women artists and their work in a time where the Gulf countries such as Qatar and Dubai for example, are investing so much in their cultural sectors as part of building their national vision. The history and current work by women artists from this region should not be lost within the process of development and that's what the art scene in Qatar is challenging. The rapid investment of Qatar on arts and culture has put the country under international spotlight especially when a Muslim conservative country hands its heritage sector to be overseen by a female figure, her highness Sheikha Al Mayassa, the sister of the current Emir and the daughter of the country's role model for women, Sheikha Mozah Almissned. Purchasing one of the most expensive paintings in the world entitled When will you Marry? by Paul Gauguin, and dedicating recent art spaces to solo exhibitions by women artists from the region, tells us so much about Al Mayassa's future vision in regards of the empowerment of women artists in Qatar. Yet, multiple communities in Qatar are resistant to such change, fearing that such art impose a threat that would demolish the Arab and Muslim identity from their culture. In my research, I will investigate the reason behind this gender gap, the lack of public discussions and studies on audience reception, and finally highlight what women's art in this region wants to communicate and offer to its multiple communities. As a case study, my paper will document and investigate the role of women artists as socio-political activists in the Arab and Islamic world, particularly in Qatar, and the representation of their work exhibited at Mathaf: Arab Museum of Modern Art.

Abstract

Superficial characteristics like physical features, race, origin and nationality have proven in the past to escalate to violent conflicts, reasons very from relativeness to belonging. Although the issue of those born to Qatari mothers is unlikely to escalate to a conflict anytime soon, it is still a rising heath concern, especially in terms of the conflicting social identity, which have proven to cause anxiety to many individuals. Unifying the state of Qatar, and identifying what makes a Qatari is vital to achieve the states visions.

Objectives

Identify the source of the identity crisis, define and understand children born to Qatari mothers to properly integrate them in society in order resolve the identity issue, and unify Qatar as a whole by universally defining what makes a Qatari? is it merely biased on nationality?

Literature Review

It its important to not that not a lot of literature directly discusses the research topic, and it was not the researches intent to attack the law system in the state of Qatar, yet, understand and carefully study the causes and effects surrounding the identity of children born to Qatari mothers.

Qatar State law decree no. (21) of 1989 Regarding the Regulation of Marriage to foreigners. This law regulates rights to be exercised by those born to Qatari mothers without exceptions. This was used to examine the actual law, and what is exercised in reality.

Anderson, B. defines and identifies the origin and formation of nationality. Explaining that humans set boundaries for themselves that are merle imagined to satisfy a belonging deficiency found within ones self. Although Mr. Anderson simplifies the problem, the question asked for the sake of this research is: can the issue be easily removed? Can society simply eliminate the self-proclaimed boundaries the same way they created them?

All three Halisi, Kasiser, and Ndegwa, identified citizen as “identification with a specific state as a form of personal identity” and followed by providing 2 definitions of citizenship, one liberal and the other civic republican. In both definitions one's obligations to the state makes them a part of the community. Thus those born to Qatari mothers living within the state are unquestionably part of society, yet, Is the social identity soullessly a factor of the state and not society?

Al-khour, A. explains that the national identity within the GCC has featured prominently since independence and became an integral part of the psyche of the citizens, thus a powerful sense of identity. He however follows explaining the paradoxical concepts that contribute to identity in the GCC. homogeneity of culture and social that defines and distinguished the GCC from other societies. This contributes to why children born to Qatari mothers are neglected in society, and considered aliens from dominant group.

Tjfel, emphasizes that social identity is extracted from the surrounding environment. Stating “any society which contains power, status, prestige and social group differentials places each of us in a number of social categories which becomes an integral part of our self-definition”, in this case; what is and what should be the identity of those born to Qatari mothers?

Zahra Barbar, provides a new dimension to reasons behind neglecting those born to Qatari mothers which focuses on the economic burden the state may face as a result of the extremely high welfare benefits and privileges provided to current citizens.

Turner and Sater however argue Zahra Barbar point, claiming that denial is merely based on reforms and perestroika burden.

Mr. Al-Shawi's literature highlights the heavy political influence tribes have on the state, thus if the state is reluctant to fully integrate this portion of society, it is highly dependent on pleasing tribes. This complies with the act of giving those born to Qatari mothers some rights within the state however denying them other rights.

Methodology

The methodology and data collection for this research paper were both qualitative and quantitative, with the goal of achieving a more reliable conclusions. Primary sources; One-on-one interviews, Survey semi-structured Secondary sources; books and journal articles, News Paper articles

Research and Discussion

Qatar's Law

The constitution lacks laws directly regulating rights of children born to Qatari mothers. This is a direct result of the constitution being relatively new; therefore, laws tend to result in complications and unintended prejudice. Only a hand full of laws clarify rights given to those born to Qatar mothers. Exhibit (A) Human Resources are required by law to prioritizes those born to Qatari mothers post Qatari's. Exhibit (B) Prioritization by law when acquiring Qatari nationality, yet subjected to 4 requirement (1) Must be regular residents in Qatar for over 25 years (2) must entail lawful means of income (3) Good reputation, and no convictions impugning their honor or integrity (4) Good knowledge of the Arabic language. However, even with prioritizing those born to Qatari mothers, the nationality is only given to 50 applicants per year. Additionally, individuals are still subjected to a form of social discrimination even after acquiring the citizenship this is a direct result of the social construction of the state “originals” and “naturalized”.

Finally, the law “Regulating Marriage to Foreigners” is the only law that gives right and not prioritization. It includes; right to residency if the mother lives in the state, granting minor children travelling documents, and equality to Qataris in 3 categories (A) Education (B) Healthcare and (C) Employment. Moreover, even though each right is accompanied with a condition which emphases on identity, these rights are only applicable if the marriage is endorsed by the minster of interior.

Qatari Society

(A) Society is unaware, indifferent and contributes to the emotional deterioration of those born to Qatari mothers for several reasons. 1- Assuming the father's identity is enough regardless of the place of birth and upbringing 2- Society doesn't resist integration on a daily bases, however, discriminates and refuse equality in terms of the law, and marriage. Reasons rage from their perceptions of Islam to economic burden (inconsistent treatment)

(B) The social construction of the state offers tribes a great political influence. This is because the states stability and security is highly dependent on tribesmen loyalty to the state. And while in peace the state instigates competition between tribes by providing privileges to some and not other because complete unity is not in it's best interest. This corresponds with giving those born to Qatari mothers some rights to maintain loyalty, while denying them the nationality.

Conclusion

Although the constitution lacks the appropriate laws to regulate rights of those born to Qatari mother, the issue lies in failure to implement available laws in addition to societies inconstancy in treatment and xenophobia, which manifested to a form of social identity crisis that level depends on the individual's integration into society.

In order to eliminate the social identity crisis, it is vital to follow some policy recommendation that follow the path of full naturalization, in addition to exempting this portion of society from the 50 applicant per one calendar year law.